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ABSTRACT 
 
Knowledge on conflict-affected areas is becoming increasingly important for scholarship and policy. 
This article identifies a recent change in knowledge production regarding 'zones of danger', attributing 
it not only to the external environment, but also to an ongoing process of securitization of research 
resulting from institutional and disciplinary practices. Research is increasingly framed by security 
concerns and is becoming a security concern in itself, although the implications are not readily 
acknowledged. To illustrate these developments, we draw on fieldwork in Mali and Darfur.  
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Introduction3 
On 25 January 2016, the anniversary of the revolution that five years earlier symbolized 
the spirit of the ‘Arab Spring’, Giulio Regeni – a 28-year-old Italian PhD student from the 
University of Cambridge who was a visiting scholar at the American University in Cairo 
(AUC) – was kidnapped in the Egyptian capital. Regeni was conducting participant 
observation on informal trade unions opposing the regime that had been installed 
following the military coup of August 2013. A few days later, Regeni’s corpse was found 
near a construction site, with clear signs of torture. The ‘Regeni case’ sparked international 
controversy, due to Egypt’s record of forced disappearances and widespread allegations of 
involvement of security officials.4 The tragedy also gave rise to broader questions about 
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Regeni’s safety. Who had failed in their duty of care? 5 Who was now supposed to respond: 
his university, hosting institution and/or country of citizenship? A statement from the 
AUC merely described Regeni as having ‘passed away.’6 Several Cambridge scholars 
initiated a petition to demand that the UK government take a stand.7 The European 
Parliament passed a resolution very critical of Egypt,8 but in the end the Italian authorities 
received very little international collaboration in their attempt to find the truth and bring 
the perpetrators to justice. Pressured by a broad campaign organized across universities 
and civil society organizations, Italy withdrew its ambassador from Cairo and froze part 
of its military aid to Egypt. Accompanied by far less media attention, the Regeni case also 
triggered the adoption of stricter fieldwork rules at several European universities. 
This tragedy speaks directly to the contradictions surrounding today’s mechanisms 
of knowledge production. On the one hand, the demand for reliable information to 
underpin research and refine policies grows,9 and researchers are under heavy pressure to 
extract and produce evidence on topical issues. Research employing field immersion is 
seen as vital for developing a deeper understanding of the hows and whys of human and 
political interaction. Fieldwork helps in avoiding the pitfalls resulting from over-reliance 
on theory, causal models and assumptions made from afar. This is particularly important 
in conflict and crisis situations, where meanings are deeply contested. On the other hand, 
knowledge production is undergoing dramatic changes, and the type of research that 
Regeni was conducting is becoming increasingly difficult to undertake. Fieldwork is 
expected to subscribe to safety, security and ethical protocols developed remotely. 
Research today is subject to heavy scrutiny, caught in the tension introduced by new 
standards on safety, impact and transparency – but is ultimately left unprotected.  
This article re-examines how we do research, focusing on activities in dangerous 
locations and reflecting on the requirements for producing scholarly knowledge on these. 
We indicate several transformations in research on danger zones and locate these not only 
in the external environment facing the researcher, but also in the ongoing process of 
securitization of research that is a result of internal institutional and disciplinary practices. 
Central to these transformations are the changing dynamics between researchers and their 
universities, institutes and governments. With the principle of duty of care increasingly 
being invoked to justify new safety and security protocols, we find ample grounds for 
speaking of the securitization of research. Securitization10 is understood here in two ways: 
research is increasingly framed as a security concern; and it is framed by security concerns. 
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In both cases, extraordinary means and procedures are invoked in the name of security. 
Additional resources are put into ensuring the physical safety of researchers, and into 
securing data along the research supply-chain.  
While consideration of potential danger has always been a factor in studying 
conflicts and crises, until recently assessing whether and how to conduct research in zones 
of danger was primarily the researcher’s responsibility. This is now changing, with much 
of the control over ethics and security taken out of the researcher’s hands – resulting in 
what amounts to governing research at a distance. The security of fieldwork is caught in a 
process that obscures the underlying social relations that produce and give value to it, and 
transforms it into an independent material reality.11 In turn, by subscribing to this 
independent material reality (that is, by following procedural requirements), the researcher 
performs her role in the securitization of her own research, leaving her with the impression 
that her work not only adheres to institutional and disciplinary standards but is also safe.  
This shift in knowledge production has profound implications not only for the 
conduct of field research, which we explore here, but also for what is to be understood as 
‘knowledge’. We begin by problematizing the labelling of danger zones as such, noting the 
changing conditions for research and how scholars are responding to these. We then draw 
on our own fieldwork in two such zones of danger – Mali and Darfur – to highlight and, 
we hope, clarify the nature of new challenges. Finally, we offer some reflections on the 
implications for practice, scholarship and policy. While the full and systematic exploration 
of these implications is beyond the scope of this article, we hope to stimulate continued 
discussion on these ongoing developments.  
 
Researching zones of danger  
Zones of danger are understood as areas where Western travellers, including researchers, 
should not venture without adopting a proper code of conduct. They are also likely to be 
areas whose security dynamics attract the attention of the media and state security 
apparatuses. Proof of the existence of such zones is not to be found in statistics about 
researchers who have fallen victim to violence – although, as shown by the Regeni case, 
when fatalities occur, these can attract substantial public attention, in turn re-confirming 
the danger label itself. Far from constituting an objective reality, zones of danger, are 
socially constructed by a set of discordant practices and discourses. Recognizing them 
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requires indirect tracing of the regulations and rules governing research access and 
researcher conduct.  
As a first layer – one that pertains to all travellers, not just researchers – zones of 
danger are codified by diplomatic practice and insurance clauses that tend to be linked to 
precisely these diplomatic designations. Such designation can differ from country to 
country, and embassies of different states interpret danger differently. That said, the 
designations applied by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, France-Diplomatie 
and the US State Department often serve as a template that other countries follow. The 
UK and French advice operates with three travel categories: green (no heightened threat), 
yellow (advise against all but essential travel), and red (advise against all travel), 
complemented by last-minute updates; the USA issues travel warnings (warning against 
all travel) and travel alerts (for short-term events that raise the level of threat).12 If an area 
falls under the red (or even yellow) category or carries a travel warning, insurance can be 
difficult to obtain, or will involve a higher premium.  
The second layer of securitization, justified through the governmental regulations 
but detached from researcher nationality as such, applies especially to scholarly research. 
It can be seen in the ethical conduct and safety/security plans imposed by donors and 
research institutions themselves. This rapidly evolving body of frameworks and 
regulations for, e.g., securing of data, permissions procedure, departure precautions, 
insurance and debriefing, differs between national and institutional contexts and is most 
dense in the North American and Northern European research environments. 
Interpretations of the duty-of-care principle vary considerably, depending on levels of 
security alert, budget constraints, location of the institution, type of research, and micro-
management practices of individual institutions. An unexplored and seemingly 
incongruous, but increasingly standardized, admixture of policies and practices is 
emerging via inputs from governments, grant-giving agencies, universities and research 
centres.  
The practice of designating particular areas and regions as dangerous was first 
problematized by political geographers, who drew heavily on Edward Said’s formulations 
of Orientalism.13 A critical approach to political geography emerging in the mid-1980s 
launched a powerful critique of the Cold War geopolitical imagery.14 Not only did it 
critique the homogenizing labels imposed upon diverse regions and their conflicts, which 
marginalized the context-specific nature, causes and effects of violence, but it also 
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contended that these labels act as an intellectual rationalizations for Western 
intervention.15 Likewise, the recent debate on the problematic usage of the notion of ‘failed 
states’ and ‘fragility’ has exposed how such discourse reduces complexities and contributes 
to neo-colonial interventions.16 In addition, and of practical relevance for the researcher, 
these labels also subsume very diverse threats under one category (red or yellow), making 
it seem as if threats encountered in, for example, the Central African Republic are similar 
to those in Syria. Moreover, such labels often fail to discriminate between different sub-
national areas, and fail to indicate the potential risks of travelling, for example via 
European airports or infrastructures that have been targeted by terrorist attacks.  
Despite the scholarly criticism of the usage of such designations – and precisely 
because these designations are employed and thus trigger the related bureaucratic 
procedures – researchers venturing into danger zones must face several dilemmas. Many 
of these are beyond their control: researchers have become and perceive themselves as 
becoming potential targets in (post)conflict and instability scenarios.17 Irrespective of their 
research conduct, the presence of foreign researchers may be perceived as driven by 
counter-insurgency imperatives of their states. Therefore, much recent literature on zones 
of danger does not engage this topic reflectively, but takes a practical approach focused on 
field safety, and can be considered part of the securitization enterprise itself. In response 
to these developments, a growing number of researchers have started taking up theoretical 
and methodological questions that arise from studying topics in locations that involve 
personal danger, with most attention being given to external constraints on fieldwork.18 
There is little new about situations where scholars cannot have direct access to the 
reality they study. Research work has constantly been marked by a ‘fundamental and 
constant tension between trying to obtain empirical data and avoiding taking unnecessary 
risk.’19 Likewise, researchers have always ‘competed’ for policymakers’ attention (and 
funding) alongside ‘stakeholder advice’, intelligence reports and professional expertise, 
whose rules of field engagement, ethical standards and processes of knowledge validation 
differ significantly from academic standards. However, today’s situation is unprecedented. 
The proliferation of sources of information, increasingly blurry dividing lines, and the 
growing awareness of security concerns have all contributed to the multiplication of duty-
of-care standards the researcher is expected to follow, while competing with other 
stakeholders to demonstrate impact. Instead of individual researchers assessing what is 
possible and what is too dangerous in view of developments in the field, standardized 
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protocols developed outside and often poorly connected to these zones of danger now 
determine the boundaries of research work.  
 
A new research reality 
Donor, disciplinary and institutional practices are much subtler in affecting researchers 
and their work than, for example, host-state restrictions on their movement: however, the 
influence on research may be far-reaching. These practices are still in the making, and a 
single instance like the Regeni case can influence the policies of many research 
institutions.20 In the following we identify some changing conditions for research in danger 
zones, indicating how this might restrict plurality in research. These changing conditions 
emerge not from one source, but from a combination of disciplinary, grant-making and 
institutional stimuli. These transformations can be broadly categorized as transparency, 
impact and safety precautions.  
Quest for transparency. Aiming to ensure ‘the highest standards of research integrity 
and engagement’ and ‘legitimacy, internally and externally’,21 the social sciences have 
ventured on a quest to guarantee the transparency, data access and interpretability of 
empirically-based scholarship. The expectation is that researchers will make their data 
available for replicability purposes: for example, in 2012, the American Political Science 
Association (APSA) Council adopted new policies guiding Data Access and Research 
Transparency (DA-RT) in political science and integrated these principles into the APSA 
Guide to Professional Ethics in Political Science. While such disciplinary moves have 
come under heavy criticism,22 the fact that more and more dissemination outlets are 
underwriting them has clear implications not just for ethnographic sensitivity but also for 
the actors and processes that researchers might wish to study. This seems particularly 
relevant for research in danger zones, where the researcher must confront many 
uncertainties and contested meanings: the openness and the rigid protocols developed for 
quite different environments and less-sensitive topics are likely to prove problematic.  
Similarly, grant-giving institutions are increasingly requiring grantees to make their 
evidence publicly accessible. These requirements tend to tighten ethical approval and data 
management procedures. One such practice is emerging in connection with EU 
Commission grants, which now emplace an additional hurdle before a grant agreement 
can be signed for selected projects. This phase includes careful elaboration of steps of 
 7 
possible relevance for the security and safety of researchers, collaborators and 
interviewees. Similar requirements are increasingly implemented by universities and 
institutes with the dual purposes of ethics (security of sensitive data) and safety (researcher 
security) often pursued simultaneously. Data-management plans and ‘informed consent’ 
procedures for field interviews are put under preliminary scrutiny, requiring researchers to 
make advance decisions on what areas to venture into and thus whom to include and 
exclude from research. 
Pressure to show impact in a competitive market. Scholars are under increasing pressure 
to show that their research has impact beyond academia. In the past this was connected 
to obtaining funding from governmental and private sources, but the requirement features 
increasingly also in research council funding and broader higher-education policies. These 
measures are introduced with the aim of providing ‘accountability for public investment 
in research’ and producing ‘evidence of the benefits of this investment’.23 In the UK, for 
example, the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF), regularly applied to all 
institutions of higher education, introduced an impact element requiring researchers to 
demonstrate the effect or benefit of their work to ‘the economy, society, culture, public 
policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia’.24 In 
preparation for the next REF round, universities are already calling for internal ‘impact 
cases’. Research on danger zones, where data are often scarce, has a high potential for 
such impact. For most researchers, this need to influence the non-academic world by 
means of direct involvement and ‘stakeholder’ activity raises questions of co-optation of 
their work in policy processes. However, with research on danger zones there is an 
additional concern: obtaining data and publishing on current and on-going developments, 
which would show societal impact, may present problems as regards transparency and 
replicability, if researchers want to ensure security for themselves and their subjects. This 
makes the two goals of transparency and impact potentially incompatible.  
In addition, research in and on danger zones should be understood not as 
individual acts of exploration and explanation, but as an organized effort: ‘an iterative, 
professionalized and increasingly saturated practice’ that amounts to a form of ‘systematic 
intervention’.25 To conduct research and to show impact, academia is increasingly not just 
competing but also collaborating with non-academic actors who operate with different 
research standards. Academics may themselves collaborate as consultants to obtain access 
and funding. All this calls into question whether the researcher is entirely able to follow 
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individual and disciplinary research ethics and security procedures. Strategic interaction 
and understanding of the work of other actors, who may operate with different criteria for 
knowledge validation, becomes as important for producing academic knowledge as 
interaction with the local context and one’s own discipline – but, to follow disciplinary 
standards, it is advisable to hide these interactions.  
Enhanced safety precautions. As part of ensuring security for themselves and their 
data, researchers are increasingly required to undertake greater preparations for 
conducting fieldwork. To avoid future liability under their duty of care, universities and 
research institutes want to make sure that staff-members sent abroad are informed and 
prepared. In the UK, research security is broadly regulated by the ‘Guidance on Health 
and Safety in Fieldwork,’26 prepared by the Universities Safety and Health Association 
(USHA) and the Universities and Colleges Employers Association (UCEA). In line with 
these broad guidelines, individual research institutions are introducing pre-approval 
processes, screenings of proposed fieldwork by university ethics committees, requirements 
for threat analysis, restrictions on travel/funding, emergency response planning, etc. 
While the evidence is still anecdotal, it is increasingly felt that researchers try to circumvent 
the difficult processes of obtaining such approvals by not including interviews with 
‘sensitive subjects’ as part of their research – which will necessarily influence their findings. 
Similarly, skill certification is emerging as part of fieldwork preparation. This 
certification has less to do with sensitizing a researcher on how to conduct himself in a 
contested environment than with how to avoid danger and take remedial steps. Hostile 
Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) for staff who will operate in unstable and 
insecure environments is becoming a pre-deployment standard for civilian officials, 
increasingly for researchers as well. Often with the ‘C3MC label’ – indicating that the 
course satisfies the minimum standards of ENTRi/EU Civilian Crisis Management27– 
these training modules include topics as diverse as stress management, organized crime, 
theft, assault and hostage-taking. Classroom work is complemented with intensive 
simulation by armed forces and police corps. The underlying philosophy is that ensuring 
the safety of personnel is ‘the single most important duty of care of states and organisations 
sending their staff to hazardous or hostile areas.’28 Such courses confer a certificate stating 
that the researcher is deemed fit to operate in a dangerous zone – documentation which 
might be needed for insurance purposes. As Duffield argues in his research among the aid 
community, such field-security training normalizes risk-aversion and the necessity of 
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defensive living.29 It seems highly plausible that the implications for research are similar, 
especially for a generation of researchers whose formative years included these 
precautions.  
Similarly, growing attention is paid to researchers and their use of the Internet. 
Social media contacts (and digital ethnography) make it possible to organize online focus 
and discussion groups – but also to track direct sources, exposing them to stigmatization 
and possible danger. Anonymization and encryption are increasingly recommended to 
protect the storage and transmission of sensitive data between the field and the research 
institution/employer, and among research partners. 30  
 
Research solutions  
In response to these transformations, researchers have developed various workaround 
measures. Some of these have a longer history but are increasingly utilized, others are new 
solutions. As above, deeper elaboration of these and their implications is beyond the scope 
of this article, so here we simply highlight some emerging practices.  
Remotely managed research. This practice, well established in the humanitarian sector 
and media, involves contracting local researchers to gain access to dangerous areas in 
order to circumvent travel restrictions. Local researchers are used for data acquisition and 
processing, with principal researchers often conducting only quick research training of 
their local team. Such reliance on locally recruited research assistants introduces 
gatekeeping issues that are difficult to address if the principal researcher never experiences 
the context he is studying. The emergence of a ‘don’t-ask–don’t-tell’ area might be in the 
interest of everyone along the research supply-chain. Moreover, problems of local 
researchers’ qualifications and safety must be recognized, and are probably inadequately 
addressed through short training sessions. Such practices also contribute to the 
peacebuilding economy, and redirect valuable human resources to cater to internationals. 
Embedded research. To gain access to danger zones, researchers may travel with 
international or local security forces, for example by conducting fieldwork while benefiting 
from the security architecture of an international organization. Embeddedness comes in 
many forms, but a research team dependent on escort by armed guards will encounter 
limitations in interaction with ‘the locals’, while also inevitably becoming oriented 
towards a set of priorities dictated by the security protocols and organizational interests of 
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the security provider. Such arrangements often entail a certain quid pro quo not always 
made clear to wider audiences. The controversial aspects of conducting embedded 
research and the dangers of it being utilized for problematic purposes were highlighted 
during the debates surrounding the US Army’s Human Terrain System Project in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. While independent scholars were struggling to negotiate access to their 
research areas, the US Department of Defense programme employed social scientists to 
provide military personnel with better understanding of local populations. 
Anthropologists, sociologists, linguists and political scientists were embedded in army 
units, to conduct research and feed it into military strategies and tactics. Scholarly 
reactions amounted to an outright disciplinary rejection of such practices.31 However, 
while academic work directly feeding into military strategies is a clear-cut case for 
condemnation, fieldwork today does not always involve clear choices about how to relate 
one’s work to other actors in the field. As shown in the Darfur study below, negotiating 
access to the field is often ridden with compromises beyond the control of individual 
researchers.  
Outsourcing of logistics, fixers. Following all the procedures and regulations makes travel to 
dangerous zones a time-consuming enterprise. In line with state and aid-sector practices, 
travel-security services are often outsourced to private providers for trusted-traveller 
programmes, consular facilitation, logistical service, etc. Depending on the level of 
saturation in particular sites, also field assistants might be professionalizing, with some 
merging their logistical assistance with what might be seen as research assistance. Fixer 
agencies that interact through social media and offer field-facilitation services are 
mushrooming. Kosovo Fixers, for example, advertises that it will ‘provide transportation, 
guide, services of translation and interpretations in local languages, accommodation 
arrangements, set up interviews’, in addition to offering insights on political, social, 
economic issues, through its ‘wide range of local connections and contacts’.32 The role of 
these fixers in knowledge production is often unclear to the broader audience. 
 
Case studies: Mali and Darfur 
Empirical insights were developed from two field-research missions conducted in Mali 
(Bamako region) in November 2013 and Sudan (Darfur) in November 2014, by Francesco 
and Mateja respectively. These cases seek to capture and exemplify fairly common 
 11 
situations in which the researcher is either warned against all travel, or against leaving an 
area deemed relatively safe (often the capital city). In both cases, our fieldwork was funded 
through governmental grants and we were expected to provide topical reports to our 
funders. While risk perceptions and travel warnings differed, we had to comply with the 
same mission authorization procedure, and commit to a ‘secure conduct’. Discussions 
with other researchers doing fieldwork in the same period helped to corroborate our 
insights. Neither author is a citizen of the state where our research institution is located, a 
circumstance that decoupled questions of consular protection and institutional duty of 
care.  
The cases touch upon slightly differing dimensions of transformations in researching 
danger zones. In both cases we observed the salience of emerging security regimes put in 
place in the name of protection, and had to rely on a combination of research solutions. 
We use these cases to demonstrate how external conditions (host-state restrictions, 
terrorist threats, UN security protocols) interacted with restrictions emplaced by our own 
institution, further limiting our options. Many of the research constraints in Darfur were 
imposed by the host state itself, seemingly trumping those of our employer. However, even 
without Sudanese restrictions, internal security procedures for ‘red zone’ travel would 
have necessitated embedded work with the UN, similar to what was contemplated for 
Northern Mali. The cases thus show a largely predetermined path of research. They also 
indicate that much of the work we conducted would have problems complying with the 
‘scientifically rigorous’ transparency procedures proposed in the broader social sciences.  
 
Mali 
The 2012 Mali crisis – les événements – started with an armed Tuareg rebellion in January. 
In less than two months, the rebels expelled the Malian army from the North and declared 
the territory independent under the name of Azawad; a coup d’état in Bamako deposed 
President Amadou Toumani Touré. However, the Tuareg ‘liberation’ of the North did not 
last long: the forces were soon driven out by Islamist groups. The collapse of Mali’s 
political regime ushered an unprecedented crisis that still threatens regional stability. 
When Islamist groups began moving towards the capital city, France intervened militarily 
(Operation Serval, January 2013). Subsequently, an African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) came to the defence of the fragile interim institutions. 
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Operation Serval and the AFISMA deployment reconquered the Northern cities, chasing 
the rebel groups into the massifs and deserts in the borderlands of Mali, Algeria and Libya. 
This area became a basis for their continued attacks. In April 2013 the UN deployed a 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), tasked with 
supporting the political process and conducting security-related stabilization tasks.33  
In November 2013, our research team entered what was undoubtedly perceived as 
a danger zone: although the fighting had been confined to the North of the country, the 
shooting of a French military advisor in Bamako had raised the alert levels. Importantly, 
sporadic clashes in the North heralded a new insurgency, whose terror attacks would not 
spare the capital in the following months.34 Our fieldwork coincided with the electoral 
campaign and the arrest in Bamako of the leader of the 2012 coup. Given the rapidly 
evolving situation, our local contacts within MINUSMA and local NGOs35 advised 
against planning a mission longer than a few weeks. However, unlike in Darfur, return to 
Bamako for research purposes was possible: our mission thus became an exploratory one.  
The team included three Western researchers: one focusing on UN peacekeeping, 
who conducted most interviews within the MINUSMA headquarters; a field assistant; 
and myself, mostly working on organized crime, army restructuring, small arms and 
ongoing tensions in North Mali. Both my colleagues underwent HEAT training. My own 
institution was at the time developing a policy on fieldwork conducted in high-risk 
countries, where HEAT training was ‘highly recommended’. The same training would 
have been undertaken by many Western intergovernmental and non-governmental 
personnel whom we were interviewing. This development produces a remarkable 
situation, where interviewer and interviewee alike undergo the same socialization process 
that teaches them how to understand safety and security in danger zones, a subject often 
the focus of research in these areas. This might facilitate communication, as both sides 
operate with the same frames of reference, but also produces particular and partial 
knowledge. Despite being a Westerner, but having not undergone the HEAT training 
myself, I realized that my own understanding (and vocabulary) of security was less 
technical than that of my colleague and our interlocutors. Many answers where I requested 
further clarification seemed obvious to others, probably because of shared referent points.  
At the time, Western consular advice on travel to Mali was far from consistent, but 
travel to Bamako usually fell into the yellow zone: ‘advise against all but essential travel’. 
This also meant that commercial airlines were still flying to Bamako, making access 
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relatively easy, albeit expensive. Our field assistant, a PhD researcher based at an 
institution which at that time had no formal travel-approval procedures,36 was able to 
conduct some reconnaissance while my own travel awaited approval. Accomplished by 
keeping a low profile and developing local relations in connection with everyday matters, 
this work proved extremely important. Even then I saw this whole situation as somewhat 
paradoxical; had this field assistant not had solid experience in the region, it would have 
been irresponsible for me to ask him to conduct what was arguably the more dangerous 
initial work, while I waited at home. Here we assessed our own safety precautions as being 
more sensible than the institutional ones. Eventually I received institutional approval, after 
documenting that the security assessments offered by the diplomatic agencies of several 
countries deemed travel to Bamako possible. As part of the approval procedure I was 
requested to inform not only UN diplomatic offices, but also the military component of 
the country where my institute is based, and I had to agree to undertake no trips outside 
Bamako.  
Facing this constraint, and given my research focus, I contemplated outsourcing 
some data-collection in northern Mali to local researchers. Given the exploratory nature 
of my trip I decided to forego that option, not least since I felt that selecting and training 
local researchers to acceptable standards would take most of my time in the country. For 
a while we contemplated flying north to the city of Gao, embedded with MINUSMA, 
which I could have reconciled with our institutional safety procedures. However, under 
UN internal security protocols, we would have been confined to the UN camp, without 
access to ‘the locals’. Traveling via land north of Segou by keeping a low profile was 
theoretically possible but strongly discouraged by everyone consulted. Above all, this was 
also contrary to what I had committed myself to in our institutional procedures before 
departure. On a subsequent field mission to Mali, the research assistant again tried to 
arrange embedded work (flight and escort) to Gao with MINUSMA. However, initial 
contacts soured and principal agreement was rescinded when it became clear that his 
research topic could be sensitive: an incident that highlights the limitations of embedded 
work in Mali. Access problems could not be entirely obviated, but I tried to compensate 
by making special efforts to include interviewees who returned to Bamako straight from 
the ‘northern front’. 
To navigate the post-2012 crisis terrain, we also opted to engage a local facilitator 
to act as a transport organizer and fixer. He proved central in gaining access to institutions, 
 14 
organizing our appointments on a daily basis, which enabled us to conduct an impressive 
number of interviews. His familiarity with security protocols and his status as a former 
parachute officer helped to shorten our waiting time. Although I never felt that he was 
altering our agenda or manipulating the trajectory of our interviews, his familiarity with 
the terrain and his reputation were such that his gatekeeping role was undeniable. 
Cognisant of this limitation, we attempted to organize some interviews in addition to those 
he had arranged for us. But moving around Bamako and knocking on the doors of local 
security officers without local facilitation proved difficult. We quickly realized that our 
‘fixer’ was not only able to arrange interviews and introduce us, but also – by talking 
authoritatively to the troops standing guard – to ‘simplify’ the security procedure of car 
inspection at the entry to governmental buildings.  
Although all our interviewees agreed that an attack in the city was unlikely, our 
research team faced daily choices regarding personal safety – in particular, what type of 
security warning we should take into consideration. Bamako might have been designated 
as ‘yellow’ in a scale of risk, but we soon found out about the existence of red lines. We 
received many tips regarding no-go areas and red-alert days from various international 
contingents, and also realized that the expatriate community was divided. Consular 
recommendations regarding off-limits spaces and times were often contradictory. In the 
end, we failed to achieve informal exchanges with French officials, due to stricter security 
provisions governing their movement. While inherently contradictory and based on 
hearsay, such security precautions were infinitely more valuable for our safety than any 
advance decisions we were asked to take.  
Contacts with locals suffered from spatial segregation. Top-level interviews in 
formal institutions had little substantial value, but helped us to understand hierarchical 
structures as well as perceptions and attitudes vis-à-vis security.37 In contrast, access to 
other local actors proved problematic, as areas deemed safe for international workers to 
reside and move around, were de facto off-limits to locals, unless accompanied by 
internationals. Even local taxis came no further than the roadblock. I resorted to 
conducting interviews in remote peri-urban areas at night, keeping as low a profile as 
possible. This information was of key value to my work; but while I employed all personal 
safety standards developed through years of research, I admit to disregarding the pre-travel 
commitment not to travel outside the capital.  
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Fieldwork was conducted while other international research teams were active in 
Bamako, where the precarious situation led to a high degree of comradery and research 
cross-pollination. Our team made deliberate efforts at liaising broadly. A local branch of 
an international NGO had just released an in-depth study conducted in the North, and we 
engaged in fruitful discussion of methodology, risks and responsibility. In another case we 
invited an NGO team, conducting their own background research, to join a focus group 
we had arranged with a local police brigade. For obtaining information on the North they 
relied on their pre-existing project terminals in the region, and specially hired local 
researchers employed for data collection. (They were vague as to what kind of training 
these local researchers had received.) We also met a few Western researchers who had 
managed to reach Gao and Timbuktu in the North: again, safety-related questions were 
discussed with them, but the details of their research methods were not disclosed to us.  
It quickly became apparent that different, possibly competing, forms of knowledge 
were being produced about the ‘Mali crisis’. Informal exchanges of information on the 
margins of formal interviews were clearly aimed at directing us towards a certain reading 
of a given phenomenon. With the entire country off-limits to us, the role of our fixer in 
guiding our understanding across informal exchanges was magnified. Reports of 
international organizations, research articles and policy papers discussing the evolving 
situation not just in Bamako but also in the North followed differing research standards 
and were apparently in competition – but large grey zones and silences about research 
standards seemed admissible, given the ‘security constraints’ under which we were all 
operating. On the other hand, had I complied fully with formal security protocols, I would 
not have come even close to the findings obtained by the end of my fieldwork.  
 
 
Darfur 
The Darfur region in western Sudan has experienced decades of conflict due to a complex 
set of post-colonial dynamics at the local, national and regional levels.38 The current cycle 
of violence started in 2003 as a result of political and economic marginalization of the 
predominantly African pastoralist population by the Arab central authorities in 
Khartoum. The dissatisfaction led to attacks on government forces by two main rebel 
groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation 
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Army/Movement (SLA/M). In response, the Sudanese armed forces and government-
supported militias, including the Janjaweed, targeted the civilian population of Darfur, 
who were seen as supporting the rebellion. The brutality of the war led to what the UN 
has called one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. More than 2.6 million people have 
been displaced, most of them to squalid camps in Darfur and neighbouring Chad.39 The 
ensuing conflict was initially addressed through a regional attempt to mediate a peace 
agreement, and the deployment of a small African Union peace-support mission (AMIS) 
to monitor the ceasefire agreement. The ceasefire soon broke down, and the mission 
shifted its focus to protection of civilians and support for humanitarian efforts.  
From the beginning of the conflict, Sudan was firmly opposed to greater UN 
involvement, seeing it as a pretext for Western intervention. However, in 2007, a 
compromise UN–AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was established. 
UNAMID, which became the largest peacekeeping operation in UN history, was tasked 
with supporting the fragile peace agreement, protecting civilians and facilitating 
humanitarian efforts. In 2009, in response to an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest 
warrant for Sudanese President al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
several international agencies were expelled from the country and the region. After a brief 
improvement in security, the situation deteriorated considerably again in 2013. Since then, 
UN peacekeepers and the remaining humanitarian personnel have been focusing on the 
areas of Darfur that present the highest security threats, notably the camps of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  
Travel to Darfur is notoriously difficult, and for years the region has been 
designated as a complete no-go zone (red category, ‘advise against all travel’). Access is 
heavily restricted by the Khartoum authorities. Obtaining Darfur travel permits is (almost) 
impossible for Western travellers, especially since the ICC indictment of President al-
Bashir. According to my interlocutors in UNAMID, even some of their staff failed to 
obtain permits. Similarly, goods and supplies underway to the mission in Darfur are often 
seriously delayed in clearing customs. Logistically, travel to Darfur is no less complicated. 
The only flights to or neat Darfur are UN flights, for which permission is required. In 
addition, at every stage of travel the individual Sudanese police officers examining the 
documents are authorized to refuse permission to board the plane. The entire process left 
me with the impression that, unless one was willing to cross the border between Chad and 
Sudan illegally and be escorted by local fixers (essentially militias), the only way to gain 
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access to the region was to go through an international organization. When such an 
opportunity presented itself in 2014, I embraced it. From the beginning it was clear that 
obtaining repeated access would be extremely difficult.  
My fieldwork was organized around an existing relationship between a network of 
research institutes in Africa and Europe and the UN–AU mission in Darfur. In return for 
the invitation, we undertook to prepare an independent study on the police component.40 
The primary report focused on the UNAMID mission and its activities, with my own 
research examining broader questions of protection of civilians. The team consisted of five 
researchers: one researcher and I had an academic focus, while the others concentrated 
more on policy and training inputs. Two of us travelled on Western passports, three on 
African passports; I was the only one working for a European institution. While most 
constraints on my research came from Sudanese authorities and because of arrangements 
we had made with the UN, it was clear that as a Westerner working for a European 
institution I was subject to an additional layer of regulations.  
The institutional pre-approval processes varied substantially, with my own process 
far more elaborate than that of African institutes. I had to fill out a detailed risk-assessment 
form regarding travel advice, possible evacuation plans, medical facilities etc. This created 
an initial hurdle, as many of the mandatory security procedures could not be put in place. 
For example, there were no hospitals of the required standard nearby. I could also 
anticipate problems with the requisite daily communication with my designated home 
institution contact, due to poor infrastructure. However, after two extended meetings, my 
research trip was approved. There were three interconnected reasons for the decision: my 
Darfur travel was to be arranged and secured by UN peacekeepers; I committed myself to 
conducting research primarily within the compound where I was to live; and armed UN 
security escort would be provided whenever I left the compound. Even without external 
constraints, the policies of my institution would have necessitated embedded travel to 
Darfur. As the state where I hold citizenship had no diplomatic representation in Sudan, 
I was also to inform the ambassador of the country where my research institute is based. 
The ambassador replied promptly, urging me to get in touch if any problems should arise. 
However, as the Regeni case shows, had things gone seriously awry, the duty-of-care 
issues for institutions employing non-nationals are more complicated than institutional 
procedures might suggest.  
 18 
While the process itself struck me as perfunctory at times, my institution 
fortunately had extensive experience with similar research and had developed a flexible 
pre-approval process. My arrangements required approval only from the head of my 
research group and the institute director. As I had only a fortnight between receiving an 
invitation and leaving for Sudan, making all the necessary arrangements was possible only 
within such a flexible system and with the full cooperation of everyone involved. Had I 
been employed in a different environment, for example a British university, where such 
applications must proceed through committees, I might well never have made it to Darfur.  
Despite the challenge of obtaining permission from the Sudanese authorities to 
enter Darfur, the travel permits arrived quite quickly. My interlocutors attributed that to 
the close working relationship between the Sudanese Ministry of Interior and the 
UNAMID police component, who submitted a request on our behalf. These travel permits 
do not take form of a normal visa stamp; they are issued in Arabic, making it complicated 
to board flights to get to Sudan. One of the researchers got stuck at the airport, joining us 
only after an additional intervention from the UN. This process, together with the 
Khartoum airport facilitation, where at times my UN escort seemed to be personally 
vouching for me, made it abundantly clear that if I wanted to follow my institutional risk-
management policies and not engage in illicit activities, embedded research was the only 
possible way of getting into the region.  
Despite the sensitivity of the conflict and the negative perceptions of most 
international actors in the region, there were no outright restrictions on our research. This 
was something that we previously discussed with the UN mission. We were never asked 
not to write about anything or not to be critical of our host, although we were repeatedly 
made aware of the tenuous relationship between the UN mission and the local authorities. 
The implicit message was to ‘tone down’ our criticism of local authorities. But there were 
also various subtler ways of controlling the flow of information – like constant ‘escorts’, 
escorts scheduling our appointments, and total reliance on our ‘research subject’ 
infrastructure. All these impacted how I could obtain information, and I had to constantly 
re-evaluate the quality of my data.  
Some interviews were conducted with the whole team in the room, others in 
smaller groups, some individually. While this was somewhat unorthodox, I never felt 
restricted in any way by my co-researchers. In fact, it gave me the opportunity to observe 
the differing standards and foci of my policy colleagues, who were primarily interested in 
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helping with the training. Our escorts were relatively junior UN personnel and did not 
assume the usual ‘fixer’ roles: they scheduled our meetings around other people’s 
commitments and arranged our transport. Their presence was generally unobtrusive, 
although their approach occasionally collided with scholarly standards. For example, they 
scheduled relatively short meetings, which led to awkward situations where my academic 
colleague or I would inevitably need to request a follow-up meeting with the same person, 
or would simply drop the next appointment in order to finish the interview.  
Similarly, some of the interviews arranged as focus group discussions proved 
problematic as these participants were uniformed personnel of differing ranks – and   
discussions ended up replicating the associated hierarchies. It was clear that our escorts 
were accustomed to arranging interviews for internal evaluations and UN reports, an 
observation that speaks volumes about differing validation standards in scholarly and 
policy reports. As a result, I saw any information from junior personnel obtained in these 
interviews as problematic. My own way of dealing with this was to follow up with the 
more junior personnel during unstructured time, especially over meals, where ‘informed 
consent’ standards would have been difficult to follow.  
More consequentially, our access to the local population was severely limited and 
managed. Due to security considerations and logistical arrangements, we needed special 
permission to leave the compound. Travel to all meeting sites was with a heavily armed 
escort –  standard UN protocol in Darfur, which some of our civilian interlocutors also 
saw as interfering with their own work with the local population. Our local interlocutors 
were brought to us by our escorts, and the interviews were conducted in the presence of 
armed UN personnel. When the problematic aspect of this was mentioned in a meeting 
with an IDP women’s group, it was pointed out that our armed escorts were under strict 
instructions to never leave us out of sight. If we had not done embedded work with the 
UN but could choose our security providers, it would have been easier to develop our own 
security protocols and ask our armed escorts to wait outside the building. This episode re-
confirmed the problematic acquisition of sensitive data found in UN reports.  
Given all these limitations, it should not come as a surprise that very few 
international researchers have been able to conduct fieldwork in Darfur. Several 
interlocutors expressed great surprise at seeing us at all. Independent research on Darfur 
based on field knowledge is extremely hard to come by and will entail various 
compromises. Moreover, many international NGOs, including the most critical ones, 
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were expelled from the region after the ICC warrant on al-Bashir. Most UN programmes 
operate with extremely limited capacity in the region, organizing their operations from 
Khartoum and relying on local implementers. Security for UN and NGO workers is 
provided by UNAMID peacekeepers, in forms similar to ours. After several attacks just 
before our visit, all international personnel were relocated to the UNAMID compounds. 
This meant curfews and further restrictions on contact with locals. In contrast to Mali, 
where research data may be produced by various local and international actors with 
competing and overlapping agendas, information on Darfur with insights from the ground 
comes primarily from the UN mission and the few local sources. Any research access, 
even when as heavily restricted and ‘compromised’ as ours, should be seen as valuable for 
academic work – but its limitations need to be acknowledged and discussed openly.  
 
Conclusions 
Calls are increasingly heard for putting formal research to active use in evidence-based 
policy-making (EBPM), intended to bridge the gaps between research, policy and practice. 
Pressures for knowledge mobilization are multiplying, as states and international 
organizations have ambitions of operating in knowledge-based societies. Maintaining a 
strict division between science and policy is increasingly difficult, and parallel standards 
are proliferating. For scholarly endeavours, awareness of this development and reflective 
reading of academic and non-academic work is becoming as important for knowledge 
production as the direct interaction with the subject of study. This holds particularly for 
research into ‘zones of danger’, where funding must often be procured from governmental 
and intergovernmental sources.  
Research is also increasingly framed by security concerns. Choices are often made 
at a distance, by ethics and ‘security and safety’ committees on behalf of researchers in the 
name of their protection. Several studies have warned how similar processes have 
impacted humanitarian and peacekeeping work, raising fundamental issues for their core 
principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality.41 Our case analysis has 
emphasized how such processes surround contemporary research. While part of a broader 
development in social sciences, the trend towards securitization of scholarship is 
particularly evident in fields of inquiry where ‘evidence’ is beyond reach, as in danger 
zones. Both cases reported here illustrate the functioning of two distinct but mutually 
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reinforcing logics affecting research: a modern form of intimidation linked to state 
repression (Darfur) and/or threats from anti-state armed groups (Mali and Darfur), and a 
subtler mode of disciplining research via emerging safety and security regimes. Indeed, the 
emergence of a new set of constraints may have impacts precisely where ethnographic 
approaches are likely to be most useful and needed: in explaining changes in times and 
spaces of uncertainty.  
The combined effect of these ongoing transformations is hard to measure. One 
immediate tangible consequence seems to be the rising cost of fieldwork, as researchers 
must overcome a range of bureaucratic hurdles before venturing into danger zones. 
Another implication highlighted in discussions about data transparency is increasing 
project standardization. The proliferation, formalization and centralization of risk 
management procedures, combined with the introduction of rigorous data management 
and transparency standards and stronger emphasis on ethical guidelines regarding field 
research, work to minimize pluralism in approaches. There is a growing isomorphism 
among research projects, due partly to the propagation of project templates via competitive 
macro-funding schemes, and partly to disciplinary practices. Resources rarely trickle down 
to those research components that actually qualify the project as ‘empirically rich’. 
Perhaps the most perverse impact is that the riskiest part of fieldwork is increasingly 
entrusted to first-time and local researchers who work under uncertain contracts, have 
greater mobility and thus may manage to circumvent the web of regulations that governs 
contemporary research.  
Both our field missions illustrate the salience of the problem of access – in particular 
access to local people – in danger zones. In a way, this situation is eerily reminiscent of 
when researchers were studying the ‘dangerous peripheries’ of the colonial world: the 
protection offered by ‘big men’ was a precondition for fieldwork. Today, however, much 
of the decision-making power is removed from the control of individual researchers, 
located instead in a hotchpotch of security rules and regulations that have to do with 
governing at a distance. The increasing bureaucratization of risk-management practices, 
but also researcher self-regulation through disciplinary socialization, entails various 
restrictions that tend to place the researcher in a safety bubble (security as protection), and 
remove her from the locals (security as relationships).  
Given the importance of knowledge on ‘danger zones’ – not just for policy but also 
for core concepts in social sciences – the academic world has been remarkably slow in 
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adapting its scientific standards. The ongoing disciplinary transformations make it difficult 
for research on danger zones to follow a ‘scientifically rigorous’ methodology. By showing 
willingness to embrace ‘good enough research’, individual researchers might feel fewer 
pressures to hide the inherent problems in studying danger zones. Open discussion of 
problems and workarounds would improve not only the quality of scholarship but also the 
actual security of researchers travelling to danger zones. However, the trend within the 
social sciences seems to be in the opposite direction.  
That said, individual research responsibility cannot be neglected. Self-reflexivity is 
needed, in relation to the subject and to the methodology. Awareness of the limitations of 
one’s research extent is crucial when working in and on zones of danger. Our experience 
indicates that access to various groups of locals is by far the most problematic aspect, 
implying limitations not just as to what researchers can do, but also as to what they, as 
Westerners, can say. As Dauphinee42 points out, the researcher is not a vessel to be filled 
with unproblematic data and knowledge. How the researcher relates to the object of study 
contributes to defining the object itself.43 Unless we can be aware of and open about our 
own limitations as to what we can say about the subjects we study, we may inadvertently 
contribute to essentialization of the research subject – at worst, leading to the systemic 
Othering of the ‘great unknown’.  
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